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Abstract 
Covert channels are used for information transmission in a manner that is not intended for communication and is difficult to detect. We 
propose a technique to eliminate the information leakage via IP timing covert channels by inter-packet delays normalization in the process of 
packets’ sending. The advantage of our approach is that the influence of counteraction tool on the communication channel's capacity is 
negligible. The novelty of the investigation undertaken is that the covert channel is eliminated preliminary, whereas state of the art methods 
focus on detecting active IP covert channels that may be insecure. 
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1. Introduction 
Covert channels were introduced by Lampson as channels not intended for information transfer at all [1]. TCSEC defines 
covert channel as any communication channel that can be exploited by a process to transfer information in a manner that 
violates the system's security policy [2]. 
Covert channels were classified into storage and timing channels. Storage channels involve the direct or indirect writing of a 
storage location by the sender and the direct or indirect reading of it by the receiver. Timing channels include the sender 
signaling information by modulating the use of resources over time such that the receiver can observe it and decode the 
information. 
Information in covert timing channel can be encoded by varying packets transfer rates (or inter-packet times) [3, 4, 5, 6] and 
by packet sorting [7]. Storage channels in networks can be encoded in packet lengths [8, 9] or packet header fields (TTL, TOS, 
ID, Checksum, etc.) [10, 11, 12, 13]. Network covert channels are described on Fig. 1.  
Сovert channels in networks
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Header fieldsPacket lengthsInterpacket timesPacket rates Packet order
 
Fig. 1. Types of network covert channels. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the main stages of covert channels counteraction. 
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Fig. 2. Covert channels handling. 
The identification problem is to find the potential covert channels that can be realized in the analyzed system. The second 
step is the analysis of identified channels to assess the threat level of each covert channel. If channel poses a threat to the 
protected system the following measures can be applied: elimination, limiting, detection. Ideally covert channels should be 
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identified and removed during the design phase. Covert channels in networks can be eliminated by traffic encryption and 
normalization (protocol headers, packet lengths, inter-packet times). If a channel cannot be eliminated its capacity should be 
reduced by using limiting techniques [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Auditing and detection methods can be used to detect the operating 
covert channels [4, 19, 20, 21, 22]. These methods are based on the detection of non-standard or abnormal behavior. 
Covert timing channels in networks can be eliminated only by normalizing inter-packet times. But this measure reduces the 
communication channel bandwidth. Method parameters must be correctly selected to minimize the negative impact on network 
performance.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we give an overview of existing methods of covert channels construction 
and counteraction in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we introduce recommendations on the choice of IPT normalization method 
parameters. In Chapter 4, we provide experimental results to demonstrate its effect on network performance. Our conclusions 
are presented in Chapter 5. 
2. Related Work 
2.1. Methods of covert timing channels construction 
Covert information can be encoded by varying packet rates or inter-packet times. The covert sender varies packet rate 
between two (binary channel) or more packet rates each time interval. The receiver decodes the covert information by measuring 
the rate in each time interval. The sender and receiver need a mechanism for synchronization of the time intervals. Timing 
channel where the sender either transmits or stays silent in each time interval (on/off channel) is a special case of binary channel 
[3]. Authors of [5] implemented the on/off timing channel. In their scheme the covert data is divided into frames and 
synchronization between sender and receiver is achieved through a special start sequence at the beginning of each frame. 
There are variants of the timing channels that does not require synchronization between sender and receiver because the 
covert information is encoded directly in the inter-packet times of transmitted packets [23, 24]. 
Authors of [25] developed an indirect covert channel that exploits the fact that a host’s CPU temperature is proportional to 
the number of packets per time unit it processes and a host’s system clock skew depends on the temperature. The channel 
requires an intermediary that receives and sends packets to both covert sender and receiver. The covert sender either sends 
packets to the intermediary or stays silent. The covert receiver estimates the intermediary’s clock skew by observing a series of 
timestamps in packets sent by the intermediary. There are other implementations of thermal covert channels [26]. 
Covert timing channel can be organized through packet sorting [7]. Sender can transmit a maximum of log2n! bits because a 
set of n packets can be arranged in any n! ways. This approach requires per packet sequence numbers to determine the original 
packet order. The method only modifies the sequence numbers, thus keeping payload unchanged.  
2.2. Methods of covert channels counteraction 
Admissible covert channel capacity depends on the kind of protected information and on the amount of leaked information, 
which is critical. TCSEC assumes that covert channels with maximum bandwidths of less than 1 bit per second are acceptable in 
most application environments [2]. According to IBM guidelines, channels with bandwidths lower than 0.1 bits per second can 
exist. There is no special need to counteract them. Channels in range from 0.1 to 100 bits per second can exist when absolutely 
necessary [27]. 
Covert timing channels bandwidth can be limited by applying the following measures: packet transmission at a constant rate 
during a certain time interval T; changing of packet rate by a predetermined fixed value at time points T k . In this case covert 
communication is possible as follows. Covert channel sender can affect the data rate change by transmitting packets to the 
channel. For example: rate change means that “0” was encoded; no rate change means “1”. The capacity of the covert channel is 
1/T bits per unit time. 
Gateway is often used to prevent the data transmission from higher security level to lower. Gateway is located between the 
sender with low security level and receiver with high security level (Fig. 3). When the gateway receives a packet from low it 
stores it into a buffer and sends an acknowledgment (ACK) to low. Then it transmits the packet to high and waits for an ACK. If 
the ACK is received the gateway removes the packet from the buffer. 
However, when the buffer is full the gateway must wait for high to acknowledge a received packet until another packet from 
low can be stored in the buffer. The time of sending an ACK to low is directly related to the time of receiving an ACK from 
high. High can ensure the buffer is always filled and vary the rate of its ACKs. In this manner, he can exploit the covert channel. 
The PUMP model reduces this covert channel capacity (Fig.) [16, 17]. The PUMP uses an average of rate of high’s ACKs as 
the rate of sending ACKs to low. For every packet from high to the trusted high process an average of high’s ACKs rate is 
updated. When the trusted low process receives a packet from low it inserts the packet into the buffer, and then sends an ACK to 
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low after a delay. The delay is a random variable chosen from an exponential distribution with the mean equal to the current 
average of high’s ACKs rate. The PUMP model does not eliminate the covert channel, but it does significantly decreases its 
capacity. 
 
Fig. 3. Message passing from low to high using the gateway. 
 
Fig. 4. Message passing from low to high using the PUMP. 
Capacity of covert timing channels in networks can be limited by adding random delays to the packets. Fig. 5 shows the 
framework of using traffic control module [18]. Network covert timing channel exploitation takes place here. An innocent 
process request the OS kernel to send a network packet, then covert message sender can somehow interfere with this procedure 
(for example, delay response), after that the remote covert channel receiver eavesdrops related packets and decodes the message. 
No matter whether there are covert channels, the traffic controller will get in on the network packet send out procedure. 
 
Fig. 5. Framework of using traffic controller. 
For each network connection, traffic control module maintains some information (network address, port number, connection 
type, previous packet's outgoing time, etc.). When an application sends out a packet, traffic controller will intercept the packet, 
look up the network connection information and add a random delay to the packet (fixed delays could be easy filtered by covert 
channel users). Delay of nth packet will be calculated according to the formula: 
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where 
nt denotes the time interval between current and previous packet-sending request, k is a configurable parameter 
(0 1),k   Rand(k) function generates a random number ranged from 0 to k. Hence, Tn will be a random value from 0 and up to
nk t  . Experimental results shows that the covert communication achieved nearly 100% encode/decode correctness when traffic 
control was disabled. With the traffic control enabled, the error rate rapidly raised to about 50%. 
Network covert timing channels can be eliminated only by normalizing inter-packet times. But this measure reduces the 
communication channel bandwidth. Method parameters must be correctly selected to minimize the negative impact on network 
performance.  
3. Inter-packet times normalization 
Inter-packet times normalization makes it necessary to delay the transmission of packets and generate dummy packets. It 
reduces the network performance. So, method of covert channels elimination should be used only if the leakage of a very small 
amount information is unacceptable. Parameters of inter-packet times normalization method must be correctly selected to 
minimize the negative impact on communication channel capacity. 
Input data for the calculation of the best inter-packet time value kt can include: 
1. empirical distribution of inter-packet time over a long period of time, 
2. maximum acceptable packet queue delay lt, 
3.   equal to the allowable part of packets which may be delayed for a time greater than lt. 
Following conditions must be met when inter-packet times normalization to kt is performed: 
1. communication channel bandwidth is not less than the set value, 
2. percentage of packets which are delayed for a time greater than lt is not more than  , 
3. number of dummy packets is minimal. 
One of the following values can be used instead of   and lt: 
1. maximum allowable average packet delay davgt, 
2. maximum acceptable part of dummy packets. 
Suppose we have a distribution of inter-packet time (Fig. 6). The minimum value of the inter-packet interval is equal to t and 
maximum equal to mt. 
 t    2t   3t                                            . . .                                                       mt         
 p(T)
. . . 
T
 
Fig. 6. Inter-packet time distribution. 
Let the inter-packet times are normalized to kt. The device processes packets for an infinitely small time and its queue is 
empty at the moment. When two packets with at interval arrive to the device, there will be the following. The second  packet 
will be delayed for kt at , if at kt . The second  packet will be delayed for  1
at at
kt kt at kt at
kt kt
    
        








 dummy packets will be generated and sent by the device, if at kt . 
So, when n+1 packets with 1 2, ,..., na t a t a t  intervals come to the device, delay of the (i+1)th packet is equal to 
 
1 ( 1)ii i d id t d t N kt a t    , 
(2) 
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The smaller the inter-packet time kt, the less packet queue delay and the greater the number of dummy packets. 
Let the inter-packet time is a discrete random variable   obeying the distribution law in Table 1.  
            Table 1. Distribution law of   
  t 2t … (m – 1)t mt 
P(   = it) p1 p2 … pm - 1 pm 
The generating function of the random variable   is:  
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  after receiving the first packet. 
The inter-packet time after normalization should not exceed the average value in the initial distribution to avoid the constant 
increase in queue length. That is, the following inequality must be satisfied: 
 ( )kt E  , (7) 
where ( )E   is the expected value of a variable  . 
The probability that the (n + 1)th incoming packet will be delayed for longer than lt is: 
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One should choose a value of kt for witch this probability is not greater than  . Furthermore, the value of probability should 
be as close to   as possible to minimize the amount of dummy packets. In choosing the value of kt based on the maximum 




) one should select the minimum suitable kt value to minimize packet delays. 
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We consider two use cases of communication channel: 
1. file transfer only, 
2. real-time data transfer (e.g. VoIP, Skype). 
The maximum packet queue delay is not too important, if the channel is not being used for real-time data transmission. 
Allowable average packet delay or acceptable percentage of dummy packets should be used as input data in this case. If you use 
a channel for real-time data transfer, it is essential to ensure good communication quality. Therefore, the inter-packet time kt 
should be calculated based on the maximum acceptable packet delay. For example, packet jitter should not exceed 30 
milliseconds to provide an acceptable quality of a Skype call [28, 29]. 
4. Experimental results 
This chapter provides experimental results to demonstrate the effect of inter-packet times normalization on network 
performance. Two use cases of network are reviewed: file transfer only and real-time data transfer. For each of these cases we 
have two empirical distribution of inter-packet time (under high and low network load). The best values of inter-packet time was 
calculated for several input data sets. 
4.1. File transfer 
 
Fig. 7. Inter-packet time distribution under high network load (E(T) = 0.00017 sec.).
Table 2. Results of calculation of kt based on the acceptable part 





 kt, sec. davgt, sec. 
0.1 0.00016 0.00611 
0.3 0.00012 0.00053 
0.5 0.00009 0.00019 
Table 3. Results of calculation of kt based on the acceptable 
average packet delay (high network load) 






0.5 0.00017 0.002 




Fig. 8. Inter-packet time distribution under low network load (E(T) = 2.33749  sec.)     
T, sec.
p(T)
Information Technology and Nanotechnology – 2017 
Information Security       918 
 
Table 4. Results of calculation of kt based on the acceptable part 





 kt, sec. davgt, sec. 
0.1 2.09752 47.1353 
0.3 1.64243 12.9241 
0.5 1.16614 5.45441 
Table 5. Results of calculation of kt based on the acceptable 
average packet delay (low network load) 






0.5 0.25739 0.89 
1.0 0.41155 0.82 
5.0 1.11260 0.52 
4.2. Real-time data transfer 
 
Fig. 9. Inter-packet time distribution under high network load (E(T) = 0.00025 sec.) 
Table 6. Results of calculation of kt based on the maximum acceptable packet delay (high network load;  = 0.001) 






0.005 0.00012 0.00063 0.52 
0.010 0.00014 0.00117 0.44 




Fig. 10. Inter-packet time distribution under low network load (E(T) = 0.02472 sec.) 
Table 7. Results of calculation of kt based on the maximum acceptable packet delay (low network load;  = 0.001) 






0.005 0.00192 0.00108 0.92 
0.010 0.00367 0.00209 0.85 
0.020 0.00720 0.00421 0.71 
T, sec.
p(T)
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5. Conclutions 
Inter-packet times normalization makes it necessary to delay the transmission of packets and generate dummy packets. 
Parameters of inter-packet times normalization method must be correctly selected to minimize the negative impact on 
communication channel capacity. Channel performance requirements may be different. They depend on how you use the 
channel. The results also show that the packet delays and the number of dummy packets are strongly depend on the 
communication channel load.  
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